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ABSTRACT
Personal status law reforms do not only manage relationships within the household, but
they are also important political tools that the state has used to serve its interests.
However, most of the covered studies on law and gender in Egypt deal with the state as if
it is a clear term and a homogenous entity, which is not the matter as several theoretical
studies on state show. Therefore, the main research question of this thesis grows out of
this conceptual problematic, and it focuses on determining the main state actors that
shaped personal status law reforms in Egypt, and the root causes behind their motivation
to enact them. The thesis concludes that the elite, mainly lawyers, judges, the president,
and the ruling party were the main actors in shaping and issuing these reforms. More
importantly, this thesis argues that Egypt represents an interesting case as law is "nested
within" politics. Personal status law reforms were essential tools in serving different
political interests such as fighting colonization (during British colonialism), maintaining
political stability within the society (Nasser era), adopting democratic reforms (Sadat
period), and improving the image of the state internationally (Mubarak regime).
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I. Introduction
Contrary to orientalists’ claims that have blamed Islam for the inferiority of the status of
Muslim women,1 Amira Sonbol, a prominent historian on law and gender in the Middle
East, asserts that Ottoman court cases in Palestine and Egypt demonstrate that:
women appeared in court routinely to register real estate purchases, sales and
rentals, dispute ownership of property, register loans they made to others, deal in
goods, contract their own marriages and divorces, ask for alimony, report violence
against them, ask for financial support from husbands, and demand child custody
and financial support from husbands and ex-husbands. The flexibility of the
system allowed women to determine their marriage contracts and the conditions
under which they lived.2
Ottoman courts applied the shari’ah or Islamic law, characterized by its flexibility and
acting as the main guardian for the rights of marginalized groups, particularly women and
children.3 In a clear distinction to this flexible legal system, Egypt’s courts today, which
also apply the shari’ah, have made women’s lives a hell, and become the main cause for
their ongoing sufferings. 4 Ottoman court cases reveal two important points: First, it is
erroneous to focus on Islam as the sole factor that affects the lives of Muslim women.
Focusing on Islam as the main cause for women’s oppression, orientalists do not dig
below the surface to discover the different sources of women’s repression, and fail in
suggesting a practical approach to face these repressive actions. 5 The shari’ah is similar
to any law as it “is social engineering,” 6 and that studying law has to encompass every
element that affects its formation “such as geography, climate and race, developments
and events shaping the course of a country's history---war, revolution, colonization,
1

For example, Ascha argues that "Islam is not the sole factor for the repression of Muslim women. It,
nevertheless, represents the fundamental cause for the repression of Muslim women and remains a major
obstacle for the evolution of women status." GHASSAN ASCHA. DU STATUT INFERIEUR DE LA
FEMME EN ISLAM [The Inferior Status of Muslim Women] 11 (1987). Translation by the author.
2
Amira El-AzharySonbol, The Genesis of Family Law: How Shari'ah, Custom and Colonial Laws
Influenced the Development of Personal Status Codes 179, 183, available at
http://www.musawah.org/sites/default/files/Wanted-AEAS-EN-2ed.pdf.
3
Id.
4
Further details will be provided in the next chapter.
5
Jasmin Moussa, Women as a Symbol of Cultural Conflict: The Compatibility of Egypt’s Shari’a-Derived
Personal Status Laws with Its International Obligations, and Prospects for Reform 8 (May 2005)
(Unpublished Thesis dissertation, The American University in Cairo) (on file with author).
6
KONARD ZWEIGERT &HEIN KöTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 45(1998).
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subjugation-religion and ethics, the ambition and creativity of individuals, the needs of
production and consumption, the interests of groups, parties and classes." 7 As Laura Bier
stresses that “women of the region should be studied, not ahistorically in terms of a
monolithic vision of Islam and Islamic culture, but through highlighting the construction
and reproduction of gender inequalities inherent in the incorporation of national and
ethnic collectivities into modern nation-states.”8 Second, political developments in the
Middle East in general, and in Egypt in particular, have played a key role in transforming
courts into a rigid and bureaucratic legal system, which has had a deleterious effect on of
the status of women within the society. This is attributed to the fact that “while
premodern courts were more organically linked to society, modern courts were directly
connected to the nation state, serving its will.” 9

A. Thesis Objective
This thesis is part of the ‘law and politics’ debate that examines the extent to which the
law is either autonomous or dependent on politics and vice versa. Most legal scholars
argue that law could not be fully separated from politics as law represents an important
tool that serves the programs of the state; however, they also stress that law could not be
fully dependent on politics as according to the concept of the separation of powers, the
actors who initiate the law are different from those who apply it,10 and therefore they are
insulated from the executive authority. Focusing on personal status law reforms in Egypt,
this thesis argues that Egypt represents an interesting case as law is "nested within"
politics. 11 Personal status law reforms were essential tools in serving different political
interests such as fighting colonization (during British colonialism), maintaining political

7

Id. at 36.
LAURA BIER, REVOLUTIONARY WOMANHOOD: FEMINISMS, MODERNITY, AND THE STATE
IN NASSER’S EGYPT 5 (2011).
9
Sonbol, supra note 2, at 186.
10
MAURO ZAMBONI, LAW AND POLITICS: A DILEMMA FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
THEORY, 6 (2008).
11
Id. at 49.
8
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stability within the society (Nasser era), adopting democratic reforms (Sadat period), and
improving the image of the state internationally (Mubarak regime).
Focusing on state’s political interests reveals the complexity inherent in reforming
laws in general and personal status laws in particular. The adoption of reforms was
subject to various and complicated political calculations (as I show in the coming
chapters). Most studies on personal status laws in Egypt either focus on a certain
historical period,12 or present a brief analysis of the different personal status law reforms
adopted during the twentieth century,13 without providing a detailed study on the effect of
the changing political regimes on the adoption of these reforms, and how these regimes
considered them as essential political tools to serve their interests domestically and
internationally. More importantly, most studies ignore the impact of the state’s control of
the judiciary system on the promotion of women’s rights in Egypt. For instance, judges of
the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), appointed by the president, issued several
rulings that championed women’s rights in matters regarding divorce and custody.
However, it is unclear whether these rulings were issued out of a real commitment to
liberal rights or whether state’s political interests shaped them. 14
This thesis has a twofold purpose: First, it thoroughly examines the effect of
political developments, particularly colonization, the changing regimes in the postindependence period, and the relationship between the state, Al-Azhar,15 and Islamist
12

For example Kholoussy provides a detailed study on the1920 and 1929’s personal status law reforms;
Hutchings’ thesis examines in depth 1979 reforms, and Sonneveld presents a concise study on 2000
reforms. See HANAN KHOLOUSSY, FOR BETTER, FOR WORSE: THE MARRIAGE CRISIS THAT
MADE MODERN EGYPT (2010); Jill Eileen Hutchings, The Political Development of Personal Status
Laws in Egypt 3 (1999) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Washington) (on file with author); and
NADIA SONNEVELD, KHUL` DIVORCE IN EGYPT (2012).
13
For example, although Berger and Sonneveld, present a detailed study on the evolution of the legal
system in Egypt, they briefly examine the role of the state in the adoption of these reforms. See Maurits
Berger, and Nadia Sonneveld, Sharia and National law in Egypt, in SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW:
COMPARING THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES 51, 57-78(Jan Michiel
Otto ed. 2010).
14
Further details will be provided on chapter 5.
15
In the tenth century, the Fatimids established Al-Azhar mosque to spread Shiism. Later on the mosque has
become the centre of Sunni teaching. During Nasser era, Al-Azhar University was founded and it offered
both secular and religious studies. Moreover, Al-Azhar institution has supervised a huge number of
national schools whose curriculum includes secular as well as religious subjects. Nathan Brown, PostRevolutionary Al-Azhar, THE CARNEGIE PAPERS, Sept.2011, at 1, 4.
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extremist groups, on the reform of personal status laws. Second, it attempts to shed more
light on the main actors within the state who affect the reforms of personal status laws. A
variety of groups such as lawyers, Al-Azhar, the state’s president, the women’s
organizations and the judges in Egypt, take part in the reform of personal status laws for
the sake of the “common good” of the family. This indicates that personal status law has
become an area of conflict among these groups. More importantly, political and religious
interests, in several cases, shape the identification of the “common good.” For instance,
during Nasser’s regime, religious conservative scholars blocked several attempts to
reform the personal status laws, arguing that they are anti-Islam and sought at destroying
the family. However, in order to show the international community its commitment to
advance women’s rights, the state, during Mubarak’s era, adopted a number of reforms,
despite increasing opposition from different voices within the Islamic groups.

B. Theoretical Framework
Examining the role of the state in reforming personal status laws is by no means an easy
task as the state per se is not a clear term that can be defined. The state as Brown
describes is “not a thing, system, or subject, but a significantly unbounded terrain of
powers and techniques, an ensemble of discourses, rules, and practices, cohabiting in
limited, tension-ridden, often contradictory relation with one another.”16 Moreover, Song
stresses that sometimes the state blesses the patriarchal traditions within minority groups
as long as they are compatible with “the patriarchal norms of the majority culture.”17
However, law, as Aquinas describes, “is an ordination of reason for the common good by
one who has the care of the community, and promulgated.”18 The problem, thus, lies in
determining the actors who identify what constitutes “culture” and the “common good.”
As Migdal asserts that the main struggle in several societies revolves around identifying

16

WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 174
(1995).
17
SARAH SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM 142 (2007).
18
THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW. TRANSLATED BY RICHARD REGAN 6 (2000).
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the persons who have both the right and the capability to adopt numerous laws that
regulate the behavior of society. 19
On the other hand, numerous scholars such as Mitchell, 20 Tsoukala,21 Charrad,22
Abou El Fadl,23 Otto,24 and Safran25 stress that in post-colonial regimes, state
intervention in regulating family law stems from its desire to consolidate its authority
vis-a-vis other competing authorities, particularly religious and local ones. However, the
reaction of the Egyptian state to personal status law reforms raises questions concerning
the soundness of this argument. True, the state undermined the religious authority to
ascertain its supremacy on the society; nevertheless, the state, before issuing any law that
would affect family relations, always considered the approval of Al-Azhar in order to
counter any criticisms from the Islamic and conservative trends that regard any reforms
as a threat to the Islamic identity of the society. As Behrouz argues, the “legacy of
colonialism has left most African Muslims, like members of other cultural and religious
traditions, suspicious and unreceptive towards what they perceive to be threats to their
religion and autonomy.” 26
Personal status law in Egypt presents a difficult issue as it is not only “temporal
law” that can be subject to revision from time to time to deal with imperfection within
society;27 but rather it is also based on the shari’ah, which is subject to different
interpretations. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration the factors that push
the state to adopt or reject certain interpretations and reforms. For this reason, the case of
19

AZZA KARAM, WOMEN, ISLAMISMS AND THE STATE: CONTEMPORARY FEMINISMS IN
EGYPT 141 (1998).
20
Interview with Timothy Mitchell, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Columbia University, in
Columbia University. (Oct. 28, 2013).
21
PhilomilaTsoukala, Marrying Family Law to the Nation, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 873, 876(2013).
22
MOUNIRA CHARRAD, STATES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: THE MAKING OF POSTCOLONIAL
TUNISIA, ALGERIA, AND MOROCCO 1-9 (2001).
23
KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM THE EXTREMISTS
35-36(2007).
24
Jan Michiel Otto, Introduction: Investigating the role of sharia in national law, in SHARIA AND
NATIONAL LAW: COMPARING THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES 17,
27 (Jan Michiel Otto, ed. 2010).
25
Nadav Safran, The Abolition of the Shari‘a Courts in Egypt, 58 The Muslim world 20, 27(1958).
26
Andra Nahal Behrouz, Transforming Islamic Family Law: State Responsibility and the Role of Internal
Initiative, 103 COLUM. L. R. 1136, 1157 (June 2003).
27
AQUINAS, supra note 18, at 63.
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personal status law reforms in Egypt offers a new reading of the “personal is political.”
“Politics,” as Al-Atraqchi stresses, “is often seen as something apart from ‘women’s
issues’ and is generally interpreted as the involvement in formal party politics.” 28
However, personal status laws do not only regulate the relationship among the family
members; they also reflect the struggle between the state and different forces within the
society, such as Islamic groups and feminist organizations, for adopting reforms.
Women’s status and their rights have been “entangled in a larger political agenda—
nationalist, colonial, or postcolonial. In such cases, Egypt being a prime example among
them, the law, as it relates to women, cannot be studied without taking into consideration
the different social and political forces at play.” 29 The state’s interference in managing
the family results in what Balibar describes as “the nationalization of the family,”30 to
serve state’s interests. In this sense, post-independence Egypt is similar to the postcolonial Maghreb states (Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria) as:
In reforming family law, a state redefines rights and obligations for men and
women in the family, the community, and by extension, the society at large.
Neither neutral nor benevolent, states are inherently institutions of control. They
are not disinterested actors. Unless forced to do otherwise, a state elite selects
among alternative family law policies those that either conform with its interests
or at least do not jeopardize them. 31
On the other hand, the most daunting tasks in any society is keeping “a balance between
politics and law,”32 so politics should not control law nor law should dominate politics.
However, reforming personal status laws in Egypt reveals the failure of the state,
particularly in the post-coup d’état period, to maintain this balance as law became one of
the essential means the state used to realize its goals. Personal status law reforms were
adopted from “above” with little influence from “below.” That is, the state’s tight control
28

Leila Al-Atraqchi, The Women’s Movement and The Mobilization for Legal Change in Egypt: A Century
of Personal Status Law Reform 73 (March 2003) (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Concordia University)
(on file with author).
29
HIND AHMED ZAKI, LAW AS A TOOL FOR EMPOWERING WOMEN WITHIN MARITAL
RELATIONS 24 (2012) Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol.31, Number 2, Summer 2008.
30
Hanan Kholoussy, The Nationalization of Marriage in Monarchical Egypt, in RE-ENSVIONING EGYPT
1919-1952 317, 318 (Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy Johnson & Barak Salmoni eds. 2005).
31
CHARRAD, supra note 22, at 239.
32
Miro Cerar, The Relationship Between Law and Politics, 14 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19,
23(2009).
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over civil society restricted the ability of women’s organizations to pressure for reforms,
and they rendered to be puppets in the hands of the state. Moreover, although the state,
particularly during Sadat and Mubarak’s regimes asserted its commitment to the rule of
law and this was embodied in the establishment of the SCC in 1979 to review the
constitutionality of the laws, and despite its continuous efforts to promote human rights,
the SCC was constrained by the undemocratic political system, which allowed a limited
expansion of human rights in order to “bestow a sense of legitimacy on the political
order.”33 Egypt’s case substantiates Cerar’s hypothesis that in “an authoritarian or
totalitarian state, the "legal policy" is a subordinate to the "political policy." This is in
contrast to a democratic state where there is a dynamic, partner-competitor relationship
between the two policies where sometimes politics prevails and other times the law
prevails.”34

C. Research Question
Personal status law reforms do not only manage relationships within the household, but
they are also important political tools that the state has used to serve its interests.
However, most of the covered studies on law and gender in Egypt deal with the state as if
it is a clear term and a homogenous entity, which is not the matter as has been tackled
throughout the theoretical framework. Therefore, the main research question of this thesis
grows out of this conceptual problematic, and it focuses on determining the main state
actors that shaped personal status law reforms in Egypt, and the root causes behind their
motivation to enact them. More specifically, the thesis answers the following questions:
Whether the personal status law reforms were adopted from ‘below’ or above’? And if
these were from ‘above’ and primarily by the state, who or which groups, in particular,
within the state most influenced these reforms. Can politics be considered a constant
variable that affects the adoption of personal status laws? If so, to what extent did Egypt’s
changing political conditions affect the promulgation of these reforms? How did personal
33

TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 232(2007).
34
Cerar, supra note 32, at 23.
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status law reforms serve the political interests of the state domestically and
internationally? And lastly, to what extent did the major legal changes and constitutions
adopted by the state, to consolidate its power in the twentieth century, contribute in the
advancement or the deterioration of the status of women in Egypt?

D. Methodology
Primary sources are integral part of my thesis. I thoroughly read civil codes, the different
constitutions enacted throughout the twentieth century, and the explanatory notes of
personal status laws as these legal documents will help in understanding the rights
guaranteed by the state to women. Examining constitutions shows that although the state
stresses its commitment to foster equality among all citizens; however, that does not
translate into a real equality between men and women. This supports Hall and Held’s
argument that citizens “may formally enjoy ‘equality before the law.’ But, important
though this unquestionably is, does he or she also have the material and cultural resources
to choose between different courses of action in practice?” 35
Equally important, I reviewed numerous personal status cases decided by the
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). According to Randall Peerenboom, authoritarian
states often resort to courts to realize a number of goals: “to facilitate economic growth,
to maintain social order………, distance the ruling regime from unpopular decisions, and
enhance regime legitimacy at home and abroad.”36 That means that the court is an
essential political tool that serves the state’s interests, and as Chapter Five will show that
most of the SCC’s rulings asserted that personal status laws, mainly supported by the
ruling party, are consistent with the shari’ah, which consolidates the state’s monopoly of
interpreting the religious texts.

35

Stuart Hall & David Held, Citizens and Citizenship, in NEW TIMES: THE CHANGING FACE OF
POLITICS IN THE 1990S 173, 178 (Stuart Hall & Martin Jacques eds, 1990).
36
Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in Authoritarian Regimes, 3 EAFQ. 11, 11(2011).
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According to Shaham, the “success of any legal reform is dependent on two main
factors: the attitude of the public toward it and the interpretation given to it by judges.” 37
The people may ignore a reform that is incompatible with their social traditions, while
judges “may subvert any reform that contradicts their social and legal beliefs by
interpreting it in a manner different from the one expected of them by the legislators.”38
In dealing with personal status cases, Lindbekk points out that the judges tend to adopt
two contradictory discourses: a discourse that views “marriage as a hierarchical
institution, stressing asymmetrical gender roles where brides and wives are subjected to
male authority” and another discourse that put a great emphasis on the ideal marriage that
is based on “amity and mercy.” 39 Therefore, I examined court cases that reflect the
perception of the judges about the family in general, and women’s rights in particular,
and they also reflect the extent to which the state-society’s conflict shapes the decision of
the judge and his interpretation of the constitution. Judges, in addition to the legislators
and the religious institution represent the main groups that have shaped the identity of the
Egyptian women. 40
I also relied on secondary sources in order to know in depth the political and
social contexts that surrounded the issuance of personal status law reforms in Egypt.
More particularly, I examined in depth the different committees that were held in
reforming personal status laws and their perceptions about the role of women within the
family. Reviewing these committees is essential in order to show the extent to which
political motivations affect the reform of personal status laws.

37

RON SHAHAM, FAMILY AND THE COURTS IN MODERN EGYPT 17 (1997).
Id.
39
Monika Lindbekk, The Enforcement of Personal Status Law by Egyptian Courts, in ADJUDICATING
FAMILY LAW IN MUSLIM COURTS 87, 101(Elisa Giunchi ed. 2014).
40
SELMA BOTMAN, ENGENDERING CITIZENSHIP IN EGYPT 63(1999).
38
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II. Did the Adoption of Personal Status Laws Promote or Abuse Women’s Rights?
Before examining in depth the development of the personal status laws in Egypt, it is
crucial to briefly shed light on the nature of the shari’ah or Islamic law as personal status
laws are mainly derived from it. According to Lombardi, since the early days of Islam,
Muslims have understood shari’ah as a collection of God’s commandments or rules on
which the welfare of Muslims hinges upon the determination and the obedience of these
orders. However, the debate has arisen regarding the content of the shari’ah and the
methods that are employed to interpret God’s rules. The process of interpreting God’s
rules is known as fiqh or jurisprudence. Some people mistakenly use fiqh as synonymous
with shari’ah. However, it is important to differentiate between the two terms as shari’ah
“represents God’s ideal law” and it is unchanging while fiqh “represents an inherently
fallible human interpretation of that law.” 41 Several feminist activists and reformists
highlight this difference to stress that personal status laws move within the orbit of fiqh;
therefore they can be changed or reformed. They have sought at countering the argument
held by different Islamist groups that reforming personal status laws is a violation of the
shari’ah.
Following the death of the Prophet Mohammed, Muslims started to develop
techniques and sources for the interpretation of the shari’ah.42 Personal and regional
differences resulted in the spread of different opinions, and the emergence of the four
major legal “schools of thought (madhahib) within Islamic jurisprudence:”43 The Hanafi,
the Maliki, the Shafi'i and the Hanbali. The jurists of these schools, in interpreting the
shari‘ah, relied on four sources: The Qur’an (the sacred book of Muslims), the Sunna
(the traditions of the Prophet), Ijmā (the early prominent jurists’ consensus on different
legal issues), and qiyās (where the jurist employs a principle that is used in a precedent
case to a similar case).44 Thus, these jurists developed this “classical method of Islamic
jurisprudence……… which would prevent conscious attempts at manipulation and
41

CLARK LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARĪʿA INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1(2006).
42
Behrouz, supra note 26, at 1146.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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minimize any involuntary tendencies to distort the divine sources in the process of
interpretation.”45 Both the Qur’an and the Sunna include some texts that are clearly
written and understood (such as a man is prohibited to marry his mother), and other
ambiguous texts that are subject to different readings.46 To interpret these unclear texts,
each school developed other techniques such as ijtihād (using reasoning to deduce
conclusion), ‘urf (respecting the dominant custom), and istiṢlāḥ or maṢlaḥa(selecting the
best solution that could benefit the society, even if it is “technically weaker” than other
solutions, and taqlīd (applying the precedents provided by these schools without
examining the fundamental religious texts).47 However, Mohammed Abduh and Rashid
Reda—two important nineteenth century religious reformists whose opinions had shaped
the minds of several jurists in Egypt and the Middle East—completely rejected taqlīd,
preferred maṢlaḥa, and asserted the importance of relying on the original texts in order to
offer an interpretation that serves the need of the contemporary times. 48 This new
technique is known as “neo-ijtihād.”49
Before colonialism, the shari‘ah, for a long period, acted “as the supreme moral
and legal force regulating both society and government.”50 It was not only a legal system
that managed relationships and resolved conflicts; rather it was a “discursive practice”
that impacted every aspect of life - economic, social, cultural, political ….etc.51 More
crucially, litigants, be they men or women, were well aware of their rights and were able
to well articulate their cases before the courts.52 They were armed with the opinions and
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explanations given by the mufti,53 and that explained the reason behind the ability of the
litigants to win the majority of cases. 54 The flexibility of this social legal system was lost
with the introduction of the modern legal system in the nineteenth century.
Thus, “pluralism” was integral to the shari‘ah,55 and the multiplicity of the
madhahib created an atmosphere of tolerance of different opinions.56 More importantly,
Hallaq points out that underprivileged groups often accessed the Muslim court, which
acted as ‘a sanctified refuge’ to get their rights. Women were not an exception. Recent
studies have demonstrated that women, in comparison to other groups, enjoyed both a
“fair treatment” and a “greater protection.” 57 Women successfully employed the court to
get their rights such as concluding marriage contracts, asking for child custody and
demanding material maintenance from their husbands. 58
The fiqh was an ongoing interpretive process that deals with every case in a
unique manner, considering the very specific social and historical contexts of the case. 59
The flexibility of the fiqh stands with a manifest contradiction with the codification of
laws which renders the fiqh as rigid codes imposed by the absolute power of the state to
realize a “blind justice” that does not take into account the specificity of every case in
question. 60 Through the codification, the judge was no longer able to choose from the
different opinions what could serve the case under discussion. 61 Reformers in Egypt
applied talfiq or eclecticism where they combined principles from different schools and
opinions without considering the “historical and systematic context.”62 The major
difference between the pre-modern and the modern legal system is that the shari‘ah used
to be “a grass-root system emanating from “professional” groups and legal institutions
that were socially grounded. The pulsing heart of the legal system lay in the midst of the
53
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social order, not above it (the most characteristic feature of the modern state).”63 Based
on this difference, it is obvious that the judge or the qadi of the pre-modern period, was
among the ordinary people, was well aware of the social and moral contexts of every
case,64 and that enabled him to determine what constituted “good” for the whole society;
whereas the judge of the modern period, as the next section will show, was from the elite
who received a western education, that was alien to the shari‘ah.

A. The Modernization of the Legal System
The nineteenth century marked a turning point in the history of the judicial procedures in
Egypt. Major developments such as state formation and the increase in international trade
contributed in the establishment of the “modern Egyptian legal system and legal
profession.”65 New councils were established to settle disputes regarding military, legal
and administrative cases.66 This indicated that the only area that was left to the shari‘ah
courts to exercise jurisdiction was the family law.67 Even in this matter, the shari‘ah
courts’ jurisdiction was also relinquished due to the establishment of a number of
judicial councils which shouldered the responsibility of examining family law cases
regarding the non-Muslims who lived in Egypt.68 These councils based their decisions on
the religious rules pertaining to each religious sect.69 Thus, the shari‘ah courts retained a
jurisdiction over cases involving family disputes between Muslims or between Muslims
who married non-Muslims.70 On the other hand, national courts were created to apply
state law; Mixed courts, relying on mixed codes, examined disputes between foreigners
and Egyptians; and disputes between foreigners themselves were examined by their
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consulates.71 All these legal developments led to “the increased secularization of the legal
system and the marginalization of once-dominant, traditional centers of Islamic
jurisprudence, such as [Al]-Azhar.”72 Limiting the application of the shari‘ah to issues
related to family affairs “served the function of defining a new public space for religion
and religious authority within the framework of state law.” 73

B. Personal Status Law: A New Concept that Dramatically Changed the Lives of the
Egyptian Women
In Egypt, personal status law, or family law, is a new concept that “does not originate in
Islamic jurisprudence.”74 In 1934, the Court of Cassation defined personal status law
the sum total of the physical or family description of a known person which
distinguish him from the others and give legal effects under the law in his social
life, such as being male or female, married, widowed or divorced, a parent or a
legitimate child, being of full legal capacity or defective capacity due to minority,
imbecility, or insanity, being of absolute or limited legal capacity. 75
In other words, personal status laws mainly deal with certain matters that affect the
person’s life such as marriage, divorce, paternity, succession, and maintenance.76
Moussa underlined four reasons for the importance of personal status laws in Egypt.
First, they are seen as the main source for women’s oppression as they manage power
relations in the family. Second, both culture and religion have a great impact on shaping
these laws, which renders the process of reforming them a difficult task. Third, personal
status laws mirror political conflicts within the society. Feminists were barely able to
realize modest success, while in appeasing the religious conservative trend, the state
chose in several cases (as I will show later) to compromise. Fourth, they do not only
affect the family; rather they affect the whole society. Family is the main unit of society,
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and the absence of equality within the family results in the prevalence of inequality
within the society. 77
The traditional form of the family in the Middle East “is both patrilineal and
patriarchal.”78 The father has the upper hand in all family affairs. In terms of inheritance,
the male relatives enjoy more share than their female counterparts. Moreover, the
husband has the ultimate power to divorce his wife without a specific reason and it is an
obligation of the wife to obey her husband. 79 Despite the fact that the shari‘ah puts the
husband in a privileged position in the household and in initiating divorce and highlights
his role as “provider, protector, and transmitter of lineage, jurists and courts often
elaborated and enforced the rights that women did have under the law in order to protect
them from abuse and coercion.” 80 Cases from the Ottoman period demonstrate the ability
of women to get their rights and to insert conditions in marriage so as to balance the
husband’s absolute power to divorce. This indicates that the patriarchal society did not
necessarily result in a complete suppression of women. 81 With the introduction of the
modern state, the situation completely changed as the state became responsible for
adopting personal status law reforms that in most cases resulted in the oppression of
women.
The introduction of personal status laws was closely related to the political
developments that took place in Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century. Egypt was
under British occupation which dramatically affected gender relationships within
society.82 The occupation was accompanied with the spread of a colonial discourse that
emphasized the supremacy of the West and the inferiority of the East. 83 This discourse
pushed the nationalists to take a contradictory stand: On the one hand, they defended the
position of women in society, while on the other hand they stressed the importance of
77
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improving their status.84 Consequently, both "their gender discourses and policy agendas
reflected a strong underlying belief in the necessity of following in the footsteps of the
Occident as a developmental other."85 Moreover, the nationalist discourse portrayed men
from middle and upper class as the promoters of modernity while ascribing the
retardation of the nation to uneducated women, who were unable to provide good care to
their family. 86 The nationalists believed that both nationalism and the betterment of
women’s conditions were closely related. 87 They asserted that the liberation of the nation
was conditioned on the improvement of society and the provision of education to all
Egyptians.88
More importantly, Lama Abu-Odeh points out that the nation-state model became
the dominant political system in the colonized states. The state started to regulate Islamic
law leading to the loss one of its salient characteristics: autonomy. Courts became an
integral part of the legal system established by the centralized state. Different courts
emerged: regular courts that applied imported European codes and the shari‘ah courts,89
that were responsible for exercising jurisdiction over Muslims through using
“uncodified” Islamic rules. 90 Besides, each religious sect (such as Christian and Jewish)
had its own court that relegated family affairs. 91 This created what Sonbol describes as
the “religionization of family law” as the state considered religion as the main source for
family laws.92
Codification is alien to the shari‘ah as the qadis or the judges during the Ottoman
period mainly based their decisions on “the voluminous legal literature of their respective
schools of law,” despite the fact that compendiums sometimes were used as “quasi-
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codes.” 93 However, the establishment of the civil courts during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century highlighted the necessity of adopting a summary of the family code.
Qadri Pasha proposed a code that is fully based on the Hanafi school; yet his project did
not get any approval from the government at that time. 94
According to Ron Shaham, “popular pressures” were not the motives behind the
legal changes that took place in Egypt in the twentieth century. Rather, changes were
“imposed from above” by an elite that was shaped by a western educational system and
was part of the bureaucratic system of Egypt. These legal changes were important tools
the elite used to serve their political interests against the British Occupation and the old
elite. 95 The fact that personal status law reforms were adopted to serve particular political
interests became a trend that continued from the colonization period until the Mubarak
regime.
On the other hand, although patriarchal norms dominated the Egyptian family,
they were more noticeable in the upper class.96 This explains the fact that the leaders of
the women’s movement were mainly the well-off women who suffered from different
forms of suppression within the household, and consequently supported the reform of
personal status laws. The Egyptian feminists insisted that the reforms be compatible with
the shari‘ah, and accepted the difference between men and women in terms of rights and
obligations, yet they opposed the husband’s abuse of his rights, his oppression of his wife
and his evasion from sustaining his family. 97 They viewed that the presence of “a strong
and united family was necessary to a vital and cohesive nation.” 98 In this sense, the
feminists’ arguments resonate with the reformers’ perception of women as an essential
weapon in their battle against the British colonization. For example, Qassim Amin,
known as the father of Egyptian feminism, stresses that “the development of a country
depends on numerous factors, the most important of which is the development of women.
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Similarly, the underdevelopment of a country is a product of numerous factors, the most
important of which is the inferior position of women.” 99 Amin’s opinion supports YuvalDavis’ argument regarding the responsibility of women for the production of a nation
“biologically, culturally, symbolically”. 100 More importantly, Yuval-Davis adds that the
close relationship that exists between the status of women “as national reproducers” and
their subjugation within the society is evident in the issuance of a variety of regulations.
These regulations include laws that determine the formation of the family through
marriage, its ends through divorce, and the status of children who “are considered
legitimate members of the family.” 101

C. The Role of Lawyers in Issuing Personal Status Law Reforms
The first quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the burgeoning of the influence of
lawyers who turned out to be a major “political force”.102 The majority of the lawyers
were shaped by liberal and secular ideologies.103 Egyptian lawyers who received Western
education played an influential role in the call for the reform of personal status law, and
they proposed “a framework for reforming” religious texts. 104 For instance, Ahmed
Safwat, a lawyer who was shaped by the reformist ideas of the religious scholar
Mohammed Abduh, argued that Qur’anic laws dealing with various life issues, could be
categorized into three types: Laws forbidding certain acts such as the prohibition of
marrying more than four wives; laws enforcing certain acts such as the presence of
witnesses in the conclusion of the marriage contract. However, this type of laws could be
subject to reform provided that better methods are available to meet the required
condition. For example, the official registration of the marriage contract can substitute the
presence of witnesses; and laws allowing certain acts such as the husband’s right of
99
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polygamous marriage. However, if these latter laws might cause harm to society and are
in contradiction with “public welfare,” the legislators might impose certain restrictions.
For instance, the legislator might order the husband to get the permission of the court
before getting another wife.105 Safwat’s arguments had a great impact on the legislative
reformers. 106
On the other hand, the call for reforming personal status laws was not welcomed
by a variety of groups: Some nationalists perceived these reforms as threatening and
“potentially corrupting” and might contribute to the division of the society which would
negatively affect the national struggle. 107 The old elite, however, opposed the reforms
“for fear of losing [its] social and political power to the new elite, the leaders of the
reform.”108 On the other hand, conservative religious scholars opposed the reforms as
they might violate the sacred family law and weaken the place of the shari‘ah within
society.109 In 1917, a draft law was issued regarding the adoption of a personal status law
that was based on the four Sunni Schools. A number of scholars opposed this draft as it
was based on talfiq and argued that according to scholars’ consensus, talfiq is “void” and
in contravention of the shari‘ah.110 However, the success of adopting modern legislation
was closely linked to the ability of the modernists to win the support of the government
that in turn was able to overcome the opposition trend. 111 As a result, reforming personal
status law “often appears somewhat haphazard and arbitrary.” 112 On the other hand, the
inability of the traditionalists to impose their opinions on the society could be ascribed to
their failure “to present a viable cultural alternative to the threat of growing Western
influence and to meet the contemporary needs of the people…” 113
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D. Were 1920’s Personal Status Law Reforms Improved the Status of the Egyptian
Women?
The remaining part of this chapter thoroughly examines the personal status law
reforms adopted in 1920’s for their utmost importance on the status of Egyptian women.
Examining these reforms is essential in order to understand the effect of the political
milieu on adopting these laws while at the same time questioning whether or not these
laws could be considered reforms that contributed in the improvement of women’s rights
in Egypt.
1. Law 25/1920
In 1920, the increasing desire for reforming accompanied with the wane of
opposition power resulted in the adoption of law 25/1920, and it was the first law that
replaced some of the rulings of the Hanafi school by rulings from the other Sunni
schools.114 However, the 1917 draft law was more progressive than the 1920’s reforms as
it included a whole chapter on khul, which was an essential right that provided women
more flexibility in getting divorce.115 This raised a crucial question regarding the extent
to which the 1920’s laws could really be considered a type of reform.
The fiery debate that surrounded the 1920’s reforms led state officials to include
forces from the conservative trend in the drafting committee.116 State officials sought to
be on good terms with these forces, as they needed them in the process of nationbuilding, which was still in its formative stage.117 In 1920, a committee that included the
rector of Al-Azhar, the grand shaykh or scholars of the Maliki school, the head of the
shari‘ah court and other scholars, introduced the draft personal status law. The Minister
of Justice revised it while the prime minister ratified it.118 This signifies that “the legal
discourse on women’s rights within the family was now considered to be the joint
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responsibility of Islamic jurists and the new national/secular state.”119 In other words, the
interpretation of the religious texts on issues regarding the family was affected by the
legal and political milieus. Although the Islamic jurists shouldered the main
responsibility of interpreting religious text, the approval of the ministry of justice was
essential for the acceptance of any proposed interpretation. 120
The committee was influenced by Qassim Amin’s call for the deviation from the
Hanafi school and the adoption of other schools such as the Maliki and the Shafi'i in
order to extend the legal grounds that permit a wife to get a divorce.121 For example, law
25/1920 considers the inability of the husband to sustain his wife, his absence,
imprisonment and his suffering from incurable sickness, which all are grounds for
seeking divorce.122 The husband’s illness was a deviation from the Hanafi school which
considered impotence as the only condition that allowed a wife to ask for divorce.123 The
committee suggested this reform as the healthy body is essential for building a strong
nation.124
1923 witnessed an important legal development as Egypt promulgated the first
Constitution that was considered “relatively liberal,”125 as it provided individuals with
different rights such as freedom of opinion and beliefs, and the protection of private
property. 126 However, the Constitution does not believe in the equality between sexes as
it is shown in article (3), which stipulates “all Egyptians are equal before law in matters
regarding civil and political rights as well as in duties and obligations without
discrimination because of race, language or religion.” 127 This indicates that
discrimination because of sex is excluded and that corroborates my analysis that the
119
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reforms adopted during this period were mainly to serve political ends, not to merely
advance women’s rights.
1923 also witnessed a relative success for the feminist movement which fought
for years in order to increase the minimum age for marriage. Their relentless efforts bore
fruit as a law was enacted that identified the age of marriage to be sixteen and eighteen
for girls and boys respectively. 128 However, the call for changing the age marriage
asserted the elitism of the Egyptian feminism movement as this law, while bringing a
huge benefit for both upper and middle class women by allowing them to continue their
education, it represents a real burden for poor women and those who lived in villages
who could not afford to go to school.129 In fact, for these underprivileged classes, the
early marriage of girls relieves part of the financial obligations of the family as the newly
married girl will be maintained by her husband. Also, the feminists’ call for extending
maternal custody disadvantaged lower class women as although the extension allows
mother to enjoy staying with her children for a long time, it also increases her
responsibilities toward her children, especially if the father refrains from maintain them
financially. 130 The feminists’ pressure resulted in the adoption of article (20) which
extends the mother’s custody of the girl from seven to nine and of the boy from nine to
eleven, 131 if this would serve the interests of the child.132 According to the explanatory
memorandum, the judge has the full authority to determine the interest of the child. 133
In the mid of 1920’s, another committee was held under the supervision of the
Ministry of Justice and Mohammed al-Marghi, the prominent religious scholar, who later
became the Rector of Al-Azhar, to review the personal status law. 134 The committee
recommended the restriction of polygamy, the right of the wife to insert a condition in the
marriage contract if her husband takes another wife, she could get a divorce, and that her
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husband has to divorce all his previous wives before he marries her. 135 The political
purpose behind these suggested reforms was to strengthen the institution of the nuclear
family at the expense of the extended family whose networks could threaten both the
political as well as the economic authorities of the state.136 However, the unpopular King
Fouad rejected these recommendations as he aspired to be the coming Caliph; so he
sought to gain the support of the public and consequently he “could not justify restricting
such a religiously mandated male prerogative.” 137 Eliraz provides a different explanation
arguing that the “strong pressure of the orthodox circles” prevented the adoption of
further reforms despite the fact that Mohammed Abduh opposed polygamy. 138
2. Law 25/1929 and the Concept of Darar
Kholoussy points out that Amin’s ideas regarding harm or darar as a ground for
divorce shaped the committee that adopted the 1929 reforms. Article (6) of law 25/1929
states that a wife can get a divorce if she proves that mistreatment or darar took place,
and reconciliation is impossible. However, it is left to the judge to determine what
constitutes darar.139 Kholoussy adds that although it is not easy to determine the bases on
which the judges can determine darar, it is more likely that they will be restricted by the
new codified personal status laws, especially when they “felt the pressure to apply these
new laws since they had become government employees, paid, promoted, transferred, and
retired by a largely secular state.”140 This stands in sharp contrast with Ottoman courts
where the wife could ask for divorce for a variety and unlimited forms of ḍarar.141 That
supports Wendy William’s argument that despite the fact that “legal activism may
succeed in extending male privileges to women, but it cannot change the fact that the law
is fundamentally designed with male needs and values in mind.” 142
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Shaham adds that the judge tended to rely on the “Maliki legal sources” as they
provide a broad reading of the concept darar.143 Did that mean that the judge was open to
the different sorts of darar claimed by various women in order to get a “fault-based
divorce”?144 Court cases, during this period, do not provide an affirmative answer.
Although some judges in several cases consider the abandonment of sexual relationship
as a solid ground for getting a fault-based divorce, other judges grant a divorce only if the
abandonment was “intentional” and “unjustified.”145 For instance, a judge dismissed a
case where a wife claimed injury as her husband’s paralysis rendered him impotent. 146
The judge argued that injury as stipulated by article (6) refers to the injury which the
husband is responsible for.147 However, according to article (10) (2) of law 25, if the
husband is responsible for the “wrongdoing” and “mistreatment,” the wife has the right to
get a divorce without losing any rights “resulting from marriage and divorce.” 148 There is
no mention about what constitutes “wrongdoing” or “mistreatment” and whether the
husband’s responsibility is intentional or not.
As for physical violence, the judge tended to adopt an elitist interpretation of
darar as the social status of the wife remains the determining factor that affects the
judge’s decision regarding granting a fault-based divorce. For instance, a well-off wife
asked for a divorce as her husband, who was interestingly a judge, used to beat her.149
The court ruled in favor of the wife arguing that “women of a lower social strata are not
injured by beating, but those of a higher social standing are.” 150 On appealing, the
husband argued that he had the right to “chastise his wife because she was rebellious;”
143
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however, the appeal was dismissed as the judge ruled that “the beating was
unjustified.”151 This case is crucial for two reasons: First, the judge’s class-based
interpretation is still dominant until today. This biased interpretation refutes the argument
“that law, and more significantly the legal system, is an arena that is free of the influence
of social and political factors, and therefore could be assumed to be a vehicle of universal
justice to everyone regardless of sex, religion, race, or any other factor, and thus could be
regarded as impartial and free of bias.”152 Second, the judge’s perception of women’s
rights also shaped his understanding of the law. As the case shows the abusive judge
defends his right to discipline his wife as a right entitled by the shari‘ah.
The judge also enjoys considerable discretion in determining what constitutes an
“accepted” absence of the husband, according to article (12) of law 25/1929.153 The
explanatory note identifies the long absence of the husband because of engaging in trade,
leaving for study, being a captive or imprisoned for three years or more, all these factors
are not considered “acceptable” reasons for husband’s absence even if he sustains his
wife.154 The explanatory note points out that the long absence of the husband will render
the wife, in most cases, unable to preserve her “honor and chastity.”155 However, in one
case, the judge considered the husband’s imprisonment for “political reasons” falls under
the category of “acceptable reason” for husband’s absence, and therefore it could not be a
ground for granting a wife a fault-based divorce.156
What distinguishes the 1929 reforms from those of 1920 was that while the latter
put a great emphasis on expanding the legal grounds that enable a wife for getting a
divorce, the former put a great weight on restricting the husband’s absolute right of
divorce. 157 Generally speaking, a divorce occurs when a husband clearly utters the oath
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of divorce (You Are Divorced). The husband’s pronunciation of the divorce oath once or
twice renders the divorce revocable, which means that the husband can return to his wife
during the waiting period (3 months) even without her consent without “having to
conclude a new marriage contract or pay a new dower.”158 However, after the third
pronunciation, it becomes irrevocable, which means that if the husband is no longer able
to return to his wife except if she marries another man and she gets divorced. In this
case, he will marry her with a new marriage contract and “pay her a new dower.159 Law
25 /1929 stipulates that if the husband pronounces the oath of divorce while he is in a
status of intoxication, under coercion, or to force somebody to do a certain act, the
divorce is not valid.160 The husband’s multiple pronunciation of the divorce oath at one
time is considered a “single divorce,” and thus revocable. 161
The inclusion of these laws did not signify an important success for women’s
rights. Bernard-Maugiron and Dupret point out that personal status law reforms “have not
been codified in a comprehensive and exhaustive code, and this makes its knowledge and
understanding sometimes difficult.” 162 More importantly, they rendered women
“financially dependent on men,” and despite the fact that they identify the grounds on
which a wife can ask for a divorce, they nevertheless assert that women are not on equal
footing with men in matters regarding divorce. 163 For instance, according to classical
Islamic jurisprudence, in concluding the marriage contract, every party has the right to
include conditions as long as they do not contravene with the shari’ah.164 Cases from the
Ottoman courts show that women had the right to insert in the marriage contract
“conditions under which they were entitled to divorce.”165 In 1931, a new form of the
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marriage contract was introduced and deprived women from inserting conditions such as
her right to get a divorce if her husband gets another wife or that a husband should
provide care “for his wife’s children from a previous marriage.” 166 As Sonbol argues that
“the so-called personal status law reforms resulted in portraying women as less
independent and mature than men,”167 and therefore they were “excluded from political
membership in the nation.”168 This indicates that the state started to play an influential
role “in shaping the practices at the center of many gendered cultural dilemmas.” 169

E. Recapitulation
This chapter questions whether the changes that were introduced in managing the
relationship between men and women within the household were really a type of
‘reform’. Hallaq points out that the term “reform” is “redolent of a well-articulated
political and ideological position that inherently assumes the [shari’ah] to contain
deficiencies that need correction and modernization rectification.” 170 However, this
chapter demonstrates that the shari’ah championed women’s rights and that personal
status law reforms, on the contrary, resulted in the deterioration of the status of women in
Egypt. Moreover, the colonial discourse cast its shadows on the introduction of personal
status laws. In that sense, law "is nested within" politics as the process of law-making is
sensitive to the political discourse that surrounds it.171 As the coming chapters will show,
this trend remained throughout the rest of the twentieth century.
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III. Nasser Regime: A Stalemate of Personal Status Laws as a Necessity to Preserve
the Status Quo!

A. Law and the Authoritarian State
On 23 July 1952, a group of free officers led a coup d’état that toppled the monarchy and
radically changed Egypt socially, economically and politically. 172 The free officers did
not believe in democracy as they considered it “as too divisive, Western-oriented, and
responsible for the country’s underdeveloped state.”173 The post-coup d’état state
imposed its grip over civil society to prevent the masses from participating in political
life; which might result in the eruption of a revolt that would encourage foreign
intervention as happened in 1882; therefore it controlled emerging local social forces. 174
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, lawyers played the leading role in pushing for
personal status law reforms. However, lawyers’ influence, in general, was relinquished
after Nasser’s suppression and containment of the Bar Association. 175 Moreover, the
state's increasing suppression of non-state actors, including women’s organizations,
disabled the latter from exerting pressure over the state to give in to their demands.
The adoption of major legal changes during Nasser regime supports Khalifa’s
argument that "a totalitarian society demands conformity, not only with rules but with
their rationales; thus, under totalitarianism, one would probably encounter extreme
acceptance or rejection of legal norms since the law is closely identified with a political
ideology that demands conformity." 176 Law was an integral part of the “social and
172
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political engineering” process through which the state aimed at forming “static identities”
that reflected the state’s perception of different social categories. 177 Three important legal
changes took place after the eruption of 1952 coup d’état: the “harmonization of the legal
system,” the adoption of socialist principles in the constitution, and the flourishing of a
police state.178
The roots of the harmonization of the legal system went back to 1949 with the
abolishment of the mixed courts. In 1955, law 462 was passed and it abolished all family
courts that pertained to Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The abolishment of the shari’ah
courts reflects the regime’s motivation “to replace the traditional [shari’ah] state with a
truly national state.”179 As a result, the national courts began to examine personal status
cases. This rendered settling personal status cases a time consuming matter.180 Women
could spend several years in order to get a fault-based divorce. More importantly,
according to article (6) of law 462, "it remains the case that the judge is required to apply
the dominant opinion of the Hanafi school unless there is an explicit text in Egyptian
legislation on the personal status matter under consideration." 181 Article (6) contributed to
the rigidity of the legal system by making the judge abiding by a certain school without
considering opinions from different schools.
On the other hand, the adoption of socialism was accompanied by state
centralism. 182 The state nationalized religious endowments that provided funding to the
shari‘ah schools, and Al-Azhar came under state control.183 Its scholars were appointed
by the state, and thus became supporters of Nasser’s ideology. 184 Nasser sought at
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controlling Al-Azhar to gain its support for his social programs and to counter the
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood who had the capability to mobilize the masses
against the state.185 The state’s control of Al-Azhar and the redefinition of the curriculum
at the shari‘ah schools weakened the ability of the jurists “to provide intellectual
leadership to society,”186 and created a status of “vacuum in religious authority.”187
Finally, the introduction of the emergency law in addition to the establishment of
security and military courts consolidated the police state and strengthened the role of
state security agencies “in repressing political opposition.” 188 Nasser’s oppressive regime
prevented female activists from exerting pressure on the state for adopting reforms. 189 In
1953, Duriya Shafiq, a renowned feminist, founded a political party known as Bint al-Nil
(the daughter of the Nile); however the state outlawed it as well as other civil society
organizations out of fear that these organizations might threaten the state’s endeavors to
impose full control of the society. 190 Nasser’s regime believed that the “idea that
women’s issues, at least as they might be formulated by an independent feminist
movement, would promote and derail the political struggle for national or social
liberation.”191 The state disintegrated the Egyptian Feminist Union and rendered it into a
small social services based organization, known as Huda Shaarawi Association.192 As a
result, the activists found themselves facing three difficult options: accepting the state’s
political agenda, acting passively towards the state policies or voicing opposition against
the state.193 However, “publicly defying the government was deemed domestically
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treacherous and could even be personally dangerous.”194 When Shafiq harshly criticized
the oppressive policies of Nasser’s regime, “she was placed under house arrest.”195
Feminists’ acceptance of state policies supports Rutherford’s argument that civil society
organizations in the post-colonial Arab states “help to extend state power, rather than
constrain it.”196

B. The Constitution and Women’s Rights
The national discourse in the post 1952 coup d’état adopted slogans such as the
protection of liberty, maintaining justice and promoting equality. 197 The preamble of
1956 Constitution stipulates that “We, the Egyptian people, who hold dignity, justice and
equality to be sacred and genuine roots to liberty and peace…want to use all these
principles in laying the bases of a constitution that organizes and protects our
struggle.”198 The inclusion of socialist principles was evident in the insertion of articles in
the constitution that stresses gender equality. 199 For instance, article (31) of 1956
Constitution and article (24) of the 1964 Constitution stipulate that: “All Egyptians,
before the law, are equal in public rights and duties; no discrimination between Egyptians
due to sex, origin, language, religion or belief.” 200 Moreover, according to the 1962
Charter of National Action, “women must be regarded as equal to man and must,
therefore, shed the remaining shackles that impede her free movement so that she might
take a constructive and profound part in shaping life.”201 These articles indicate the
194
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state’s commitment to foster the principle of citizenship as no difference between
Muslims and Christians or between men and women. 202 However, as I will show later on
this chapter, the state focused on strengthening equality between men and women in the
public life (education and work); however the state’s political interests and calculations
prevented the adoption of personal status law reforms that would enable women to be
equal to men within the family, especially in the issues regarding divorce and custody.

C. State feminism
The post-coup d’état era witnessed the spread of a new discourse concerning citizenship
and the emergence of what Mervat Hatem describes as “state feminism”. 203 This type of
feminism included the state’s “recognition of women as enfranchised citizens and the
explicit commitment by the Nasser regime to liberate women in order to guarantee their
inclusion and participation in the post-revolutionary nation on an equal footing with
men.”204 State feminism sought to make Egyptian women into “modern political
subjects” who contribute in the development of their nation. 205 It was an integral part of
Nasser’s modernization plan, and it was realized through the adoption of new laws and
social programs.206 Women had equal access to hiring and education, and working
mothers enjoyed social protections. 207 In fact, the “proportion of working women in the
total female population increased from 2.3 percent in 1947 to 8.2 percent in 1968.” 208
As for women’s political rights, Nasser granted Egyptian women the right to
vote,209 and a number of women became deputies in the National Assembly. 210 By
empowering women politically, Nasser challenged the authority of Al-Azhar which,
before the eruption of the 1952 coup d’état, issued an opinion regarding the incompetence
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of women to vote, and to take part in political decision making under the pretext that
women “were emotionally unstable, possessed unsound judgment, and strayed from the
path of wisdom even when they received a good education.”211 In the wake of the 1952
coup d’état, a group of Egyptian feminists demonstrated for women’s right to vote, and
four years later they were granted this right.212 During that time, Al-Azhar was under the
umbrella of the state and therefore it did not oppose Nasser’s decision regarding granting
women’s political rights.

D. Reasons Behind The Failure to Adopt Personal Status Law Reforms213
Nasser’s regime put a great emphasis on fostering “equality for women in voting,
education, and employment, but did nothing to modify the gender inequities in divorce
institutionalized by the personal status laws of the 1920s.”214 Despite the ongoing calls of
women activists for reforming personal status laws, no changes were made. Botman
ascribes the reluctance of the state to adopt reforms to the conservative nature of the
military Nasser regime, which “had no interest in extending [its] progressive attitudes to
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the private domain of the family, considering traditional domestic relations inviolable.”215
Jones-Pauly and Tuqan add that the ongoing conflicts with Israel resulted in the
"militarization of the society" which largely impacted the relationship between men and
women. 216 It consolidated patriarchy as "[m]en need to be assured that the women left
behind know their place in the home, under the leadership of an absent husband, and are
as obedient as a soldier to his commander."217 Botman as well as Jones-Pauly and
Tuqan’s arguments are flawed as a committee was held to discuss the possibilities to
change personal status laws, and draft laws were issued, and this reflected the state’s
desire in reforming family laws. However, the failure of pushing for the reform of
personal status laws was attributed to a variety of reasons, chief among them:
1. The Presence of Conservative Religious Scholars
The scholars of Al-Azhar “present themselves as the voice of the society’s
conscience and view the institution as playing a paternalistic role, guiding Egypt as well
as protecting its people’s interests.”218 Al-Azhar, the formal religious institution, is often
regarded as a symbol of adopting wasatiyya or “a modernist approach that stresses being
reasonable, moderate, and friendly to the public interest.”219 However, Al-Azhar does not
represent a homogenous institution that adopts a common view as it includes traditional,
moderate and secular scholars. The “traditionalist Islamists” (or conservative Islamists)
vehemently oppose democracy and stick to a “verbatim” interpretation of the religious
texts; “modernist Islamists” stress the compatibility between Islam and democracy and
while they accept old readings of religious texts, they call for a new interpretation to meet
modern needs; and “secularists” assert the separation between Islam and politics, strongly
reject the superiority of old interpretations, and call for a “more rationalist, relativistic,
and inductionist reading.”220 But even if modernist Islamists accept the marriage between
Islam and democracy, this does not necessarily indicate their full support of women’s
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rights, particularly within the private sphere. Mahmud Shaltut, a modernist Islamic
scholar and the Rector of Al-Azhar in the 1960’s welcomed women’s participation in
political life: however, he rejected the abolishment of polygamy arguing that it “a part of
Islam” and even “called for state support of polygamous families among the poor.”221
Despite Nasser’s control of Al-Azhar, the latter did not lose its complete
independence. As Moustafa argues the state "can often adopt policies that will enhance
its “autonomy” from societal influences, but this strategy can never achieve complete
success.”222 The religious authority regained a part of its influence when the matter is
related to the implementation of the shari‘ah.223 Nasser’s regime was reluctant to
pressure Al-Azhar to support reforms of personal status laws; which revealed the
presence of “a tacit bargain between the state and religious leaders.”224 Al-Azhar’s
authority would be relinquished in certain areas, but in matters regarding family law it
would increase. 225 As Laura Bier argues, women’s activists’ calls for reforms failed as
they relied on “the will of state functionaries and institutions to take a more active role in
regulating domestic relations and curbing the authority of religious officials, a role the
state proved reluctant to accept.”226 The intricate relationship between the Nasser regime
and Al-Azhar supports Olsen’s thesis that the state reaction to family law, be it
intervention or non-intervention, reflects the fact that the state “makes political
choices.”227 Nasser avoided antagonizing the religious institution, as he was well aware
of the effect of religion and of Islam in particular in mobilizing the masses; a
mobilization that was essential in supporting Nasser’s ideology of Arab nationalism. 228
Nasser “was unwilling to “rock the boat” and destabilize his hold on the country by
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provoking the wrath and opposition and thus alienating the conservative sects of society,
such as the clerics and growing Islamist contingencies.” Al-Atraqchi argues. 229
Women activists tried to benefit from the emerging discourse on citizenship, and
“called upon the state to regulate the rights of men under shari‘ah law in the interests of
protecting the family and its most vulnerable members: women and children.” 230
However, Al-Azhar’s scholars voiced its rejection to the women’s call and stressed that
the existing family laws were sufficient to maintain the stability of the family “as the
pillar of revolutionary society.”231 They added that the adoption of any reforms would be
in contradiction with the Islamic understanding of gender rights. 232 As a result, personal
status laws remained intact until 1979.233
For instance, a group of women activists called for the restriction of divorce by
making “husbands’ rights to divorce their wives subject to judicial approval.”234
Al-Azhar’s scholars rejected the restriction of divorce on the grounds that discussing
divorce cases before the court might disclose “family secrets” and would harm children’s
interests.235 This was not the first time that the issue of restricting the divorce by the court
to be raised. In 1945, a similar proposal was introduced as it suggested the prohibition of
issuing a divorce without the court consent and in cases of violation, the husband is
subject to prison or paying fine or both punishments.236 However, religious conservatives
strongly opposed this proposal. 237 The rejection of the proposal in the pre-and post- coup
d’état eras reflected the deep-rooted patriarchal culture within Egyptian society. The
protection of family secrets and children interests, I would argue, do not present justified
reasons for restricting divorce. As I mentioned on the previous chapter, article (6) of law
25 (1929) allows a wife to get a fault-based divorce if she proves that harm took place.
In her attempt to demonstrate the occurrence of harm, the wife might divulge family
secrets that would affect the children’s interest later on. This indicates that the
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rejectionists concealed their patriarchal tendencies under the pretext of protecting the
family.
Al-Azhar’s rejection of the women’s call refutes Abou El Fadl’s argument that the
state’s efforts to weaken religious schools and Al-Azhar rendered the jurists as “religious
advisers” who failed in shaping “social or political policy in any meaningful way.” 238
The increasing influence of Al-Azhar on curbing the reforms of family laws explains the
reason behind the success of patriarchal systems in imposing a conservative perception
that restricts women’s rights despite the ongoing change of economic as well as political
conditions. 239
2. The Egyptian-Syrian Union
Regional relations also contributed in the postponement of the adoption of any
reforms. In 1958, the House of Representatives of Syria and the National Assembly of
Egypt signed an agreement to form a union between the two states, and President Nasser
was elected as the president of that union or the United Arab Republic. 240 Najjar points
out that in 1960, efforts were made to form a personal status law that would include
principles from both the Egyptian and Syrian legal systems. The draft law addressed
important issues such as the abolishment of all types of divorce that were pronounced
through oath, the right of the wife to ask for a divorce if her husband takes another wife
without her consent, and the right of the wife to get maintenance for six months in case of
“pending legal proceedings for divorce.”241 The draft law was considered the “greatest
legislative revolution in family relations.” 242 However, the dissolution of the Union and
the rejection of conservative religious scholars prevented the promulgation of the law. 243
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3. The 1967 Defeat
In 1967, the government announced its readiness to issue a new personal status
law that would meet the demands of the feminists; however the eruption of June War
aborted its issuance. 244 The humiliating defeat in this war left an imprint on the
Egyptians. Islamist groups who started to gain more popularity ascribed the defeat to “a
widespread drift from religion”, and the solution was to return again to religion. 245 As I
will show later, the religious/Islamic trend continued to have a strong presence during
Sadat and Mubarak, and that has a had a great impact on personal status reforms as an
ongoing clash was ensued between the Islamists who perceived these reforms as antiIslam, and the state which employed Al-Azhar to stress the compatibility of these reforms
with the shari‘ah.
4. The Political Underrepresentation of Egyptian Women
Women did not have the chance to take part in the decision making process and
were kept away from the judiciary and the religious institution. 246 Forbidden from serving
in the military, women “were not part of the revolutionaries’ inner circle”, and that meant
that men enjoyed the upper hand in determining the “social and political behavior.” 247
Moreover, granting women the right of vote did not result in an increase participation of
women in the political life. On the contrary, women still considered “themselves as
political appendages of their husbands.” 248 Saiza Nabarawi, a well known Egyptian
feminist, found a great difficulty in convincing women from changing their passivity into
active political action. 249
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E. Recapitulation
Women pinned hopes on the post coup d’état period to get more rights in the public and
private spheres. By adopting state feminism, women’s status in the public sphere was
improved as they had access to education, employment and health care. However, no
major success was achieved on the private domain. Nasser and the military officers led a
coup d’état that changed Egypt radically; however, they did not have the “intention of
carrying out a social revolution or defying the conservative forces whose cultural
convictions held that women’s rightful place was inside the home serving their husbands
and children.”250 The abolishment of the shari‘ah courts added to women’s suffering.
When filing a case to get their rights, women could wait for several years until the case is
settled.
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IV. Sadat Regime: When Personal Status Laws Became an Essential Tool to Further
the State’s Liberal Ideology
The 1970’s witnessed the support of several governments in the Middle East to different
Islamic movements to realize two goals: First, to confront the increasing threat imposed
by Marxist and Leftist groups, and second to present themselves to the public as
protectors of the shari‘ah, and thus strengthening “their own power base.” 251 As a result,
the attachment to the shari‘ah was the main feature that distinguished the nationalist
discourse during both Sadat and Mubarak regime from that of Nasser era. 252 The new
discourse resulted in a period of cooperation followed by confrontations between the
regimes and different Islamic organizations. 253 The outcome “was a recreation of ethnic
and gendered divisions in Egyptian society.”254
State policies towards women’s rights are affected by a number of factors such as
the state’s perception about the ideal roles of men and women within the society, the
prevalence of certain traditions, and the influence of religious and ethnic communities. 255
The constitutions of Egypt tended to emphasize the family, rather, the individual, as the
main component of the political society. 256 For example, article (9) of 1971 Constitution
states: “The family is the basis of the society and is founded on religion, morality and
patriotism. The state is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian family—
together with the values and traditions it embodies—while affirming and developing this
character in the relations within the Egyptian society.”257 This raises a critical question
regarding the extent the state can prioritize the interests of the family over those of
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citizenship (particularly equality of rights). Often, the state sacrifices women’s rights to
full citizenship under the pretext of preserving the cultural demands of the society
regarding the issues of marriage, divorce and education. 258
A. Article (2) of 1971 Constitution
According to Wickham, “Islam was central to Anwar Sadat’s self image and claim to
political authority.”259 This was manifested in the promotion of Islamic programs in the
media and educational institutions, the release of Muslim Brotherhood leaders that were
put in prison during Nasser’s era, and the encouragement of the formation of Islamic
students groups within the universities to counterbalance the communist groups that
wielded enormous influence over students. 260 Another important manifestation of Sadat’s
regime’s commitment to Islam was the insertion of article (2) which stipulates that “Islam
is the religion of the state,”261 and that the shari‘ah is a principal source of legislation.
Since that time, Egypt has witnessed what Lombardi refers to as “constitutional
Islamization.”262 In 1980, an important amendment was introduced to article (2) of 1971
Constitution and rendered the shari‘ah as the “principal” source of legislation. The
purpose of amending article (2) was the fact that making the shari‘ah just a source among
different sources of legislation raises the possibility of contradiction might occur between
it and other sources of law.263 However, does the inclusion of article (2) render the state
theocratic? According to Zaki, this article asserts the secularization of the state “by
increasing the state monopoly over defining the public role of religion and how it is
interpreted and practiced.”264 Through the SCC and religious institutions that are under
the state’s grip, the state is offering an “official” interpretation of the [shari‘ah]; thus
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countering the increasing danger of the Islamic groups who sought to use Islam as
“political mobilization.”265
Based on article (2), all laws have to be compatible with the shari‘ah; however
what “this meant in concrete terms and how this would be put into action was not entirely
clear and is still a matter of some debate.”266 This created what Dixon and Ginsberg
describe as “constitutional deferral,” where the drafters inscribed a particular principle in
ambiguous form, leaving the interpretation of the principle by the judicial institution. 267
For instance, in 1974, a divorced wife asked the court to keep her daughter in her custody
after she reaches the legal age as identified by the law, by which the custody will move to
the father. 268 Trying to benefit from the ambiguity of the term shari‘ah in article (2), the
wife argued that the opinion of the Maliki legal school be applied in her case instead of
the Hanafi school, especially that the Constitution did not specify a particular school that
the court should follow. 269 The wife chose the Maliki school as it gives the mother the
right to keep the custody of her daughter until she gets married, while the Hanafi school
allows the mother the right of custody until the daughter reaches the age of nine. 270
She asserted that as “the constitution does not specify, a state’s preference for one
madhhab [school] would be contrary to the constitution as well as being discriminatory
against mothers.”271 The judge, however, dismissed the case arguing that “it was the
"lawgiver's"'(meaning the state or the ruler) prerogative to choose what madhhab to apply
and the lawgiver preferred the Hanafi madhhab.”272 He added that the state has the
absolute authority to choose the madhhab that meets the needs of the society and that
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when the girl reaches the age of 9, she starts to have “sexual awareness which needed to
be controlled and placed under male protection.” 273 The judge’s opinion sanctioned the
state’s monopolization of interpreting the shari‘ah in order to serve the interests of the
society, and that the president has the ultimate authority to determine the “common good”
for society.

B. Law 44/1979274
In the mid 1970’s, major political developments took place and cast their shadow on
women’s status in Egypt. The increasing people attachment to the Islamist groups, and
the assassination of the minister of religious endowments ended the short honeymoon
between the regime and the Islamists.275 On the other hand, Sadat paid a great attention to
the international environment as he embarked on his economic liberalization programs
and he was looking for attracting foreign investment. Sadat’s concern about the reforms
of personal status laws did not stem from a real desire for improving women’s conditions.
Rather, personal status laws were political tools that Sadat employed to voice his desire
to adopt democratic reforms (that paid special attention to the rights of marginalized
groups such as women), alleviate some of the hardships embedded in the old laws, and
“appeal to the Western-oriented constituency both inside and outside the country that
Sadat courted.”276 Moreover, after his visit to Israel in 1977, Sadat stressed that Egypt
was entering the phase of “al-binā al ḥaḍārī” or the building of a civilized society where
individuals, be they men or women, should have a social security system. 277 He stressed
that women, more than men, were in a desperate need of such security system to protect
them from the bad behavior of some husbands who left their wives without any shelter
after twenty or thirty years of marriage. 278 Being aware of the attempt of some husbands
to misuse religion to subjugate their wives, Sadat voiced his intention to issue a law that
273
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would protect women who were miserable but at the same time it would not contradict
with the shari‘ah.279 “I direct my government speedily to issue a law on Personal Status
that would ensure security and protection for the Egyptian woman. That is what is
demanded by religion, both Islam and Christianity, in both word and spirit. Woman must
have all her rights,” Sadat asserted.280 As a result, in 1979, he issued law 44 through a
presidential decree as the People Assembly was in recess. Once the Assembly was
convened,281 the law was sent to get the final approval. 282
Law 44/1979 was not the first attempt to reform personal status laws. According
to Al-Nowaihi, in 1974 the Minister of Social Affairs, Dr. Aisha Ratib, presented a
proposal of new personal status law that contained numerous points: First, a husband has
to divorce his wife before the court; otherwise he will be subject to imprisonment or
paying fines. Second, a husband is not allowed to take another wife except after getting
the court’s approval. The court has to ascertain that the husband will treat his wives
equally. Failure to inform the court will subject the husband to imprisonment or paying
fines. Third, the judge has to determine a certain amount of compensation based on the
husband’s financial conditions to the divorced wife. 283 However, the proposed law was
met with a fierce opposition from the Rector of Al-Azhar who issued a statement voicing
his opposition to the draft law and warning that the draft contravened the shari‘ah.284
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As a result, the draft was not passed. After the death of Al-Azhar’s Rector in 1978, the
state found that this was the suitable time to issue law 44.285
Law 44 /1979 rendered polygamy as one of the causes for a wife to get an
“automatic divorce” without even proving that the second marriage causes a type of harm
or darar.286 The law enabled the divorced wife to remain in the conjugal house; that was
done because “motherhood was a politically valuable service, the state was willing to
ensure for women the living conditions that would facilitate raising children.” 287
Moreover, according to this law, child support remains one of the father’s obligations,
and the mother has the right of custody of the daughter until the age of 12 and the boy
until age of 10; however the court could extend the mother custody “to fifteen for boys
and until marriage for girls.”288
The law was passed despite the fiery debate that was provoked between three
groups: feminists and liberals who applauded the law, the conservatives who rejected it,
and a third group who voiced its discontent for the “manner in which the president
bypassed normal parliamentary procedures and presented the Assembly with a fait
accompli?” 289 The law was passed through a presidential decree in the absence of the
People Assembly, and when it reconvened, it was passed without any discussion; an
action that several feminists and opposing groups considered undemocratic. 290 Moreover,
fundamentalists considered the right of the wife to get a divorce if her husband marries
another woman “as an attack on polygamy as such—practiced by the Prophet himself.” 291
Had the state‘s party (the National Democratic Party) not dominated most of the
Assembly seats, the law would never see light.292
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To challenge the criticisms made by diehard religious conservatives (regarding
the incompatibility of the reforms with the shari‘ah),293 Sadat got the approval of the new
Rector of Al-Azhar, the mufti and the minister of Awqaf. 294 All agreed that the reforms
were consistent with the principles of the shari‘ah and contributed in maintaining
harmony within the family and promoting social justice. 295 In fact, all these three
prominent religious scholars took part in the preparatory committee that examined law 44
and came into conclusion that the new reforms were in harmony with the shari‘ah.296
Taking into consideration that these scholars represented “the three top religious
dignitaries in Egypt,”297 and were also state officials, this indicates that under the
pressure of Sadat, they offered an interpretation that serves the interest of the state, and
that their interpretation had a great prominence on the public.
Thus, law 44/1979 presented an interesting situation: both the proponents and
opponents justified their stands by referring to the shari‘ah.298 Thus, the interpretation of
the religious texts is closely related to politics and the supremacy of one interpretation
over others is largely based on the state’s political interests to adopt such interpretation.
On the other hand, Hutchings argues that the “struggle over family law represents, more
than any other public battle, a clash over the identity of the state.”299 The case of Egypt
illustrates that the state holds the same identity of the society: Islam. However, the
difference lies in the fact that the state and the society have a different reading of Islam.
On the other hand, the political liberalization that Sadat adopted, did not lead to
the emergence of independent women’s organizations; on the contrary the state imposed
its authority on these organizations, and its members did not try to challenge the state
dominance as they enjoyed “the status of junior partners of the state.”300 This resulted in
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the inability of women’s organizations to exert pressure on the state to adopt more
reforms. 301 Sadat’s concern to establish a strong alliance with the Islamists resulted in the
emphasis of the secular trend that personal status law reforms had to be consistent with
the shari‘ah. However, the prevailed interpretation of the shari‘ah was conservative that
denied women a lot of their rights. As Hatem stresses that “[n]ot only did the state
continue to define the status of all other groups through a conservative reading of
[shari‘ah], but it also prevented them from organizing politically to reverse their
subordination.”302

C. Recapitulation
During Sadat’s rule, the changing relations between the state and Islamist groups had a
great impact on the reform of personal status laws. Hatem argues that when the
relationship between the state and Islamists blossomed at the beginning of the 1970s, the
government stressed that Islam clearly defined the sort of jobs that fit women’s nature,
conditioned that their dresses would be consistent with the shari‘ah, and that their jobs
would not affect their responsibility within the family. However, when the relationship
between the regime and the Islamists started to deteriorate after the assassination of the
minister of religious affairs (by one of the militant groups), women’s rights were
expanded as a result. This was evident in the issuance of two important decrees in 1979.
The first decree added thirty seats for women in parliament, and granted them twenty
percent of all local governorate councils. The second decree, on the other hand, brought
about new personal status law reforms. 303 For Sadat, these reforms were essential for
expanding his “political legitimacy,”304 and improving the image of the state
internationally. However, as the next chapter will show that the Islamist trend
vehemently opposed these reforms and pressured for abrogating them.
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V-Mubarak Regime: Personal Status Laws Became an Area of Conflict between the
State, the Islamists, and Women’s Organizations

A. A “Passive Islamic Revolution” in Egypt
Since assuming power in 1981, President Mubarak stressed his full commitment to
establish democracy and respect human rights. However, Mubarak was worried about
adopting real democratic changes out of fear that Islamic fundamentalists could access
power.305 At the same time, Mubarak could not exclude completely the Islamists from the
political scene as they had a wide impact on a considerable portion of the public. As a
result, he allowed few numbers of Islamists to take part in the political life to a little
degree so they could not threaten the state legitimacy.
While Iran, in 1979,witnessed the eruption of an Islamic revolution that toppled
the regime of the Shah, Egypt started to undergo what Assef Bayat describes as a
“passive revolution” or a “civil Islam” that gradually penetrated the society through
charity associations, professional syndicates, youth organizations, schools, and
universities, although it failed in uprooting Mubarak regime. 306 A clear manifestation of
the increasing presence of the Islamist groups within the Egyptian society was the spread
of hijab or the veil. Muslim women, in Egypt and several Islamic countries, identified
themselves through donning the veil which symbolized “a religio-nationalist reaction
against a perceived Western anti-Islamic cultural imperialism.”307 Moreover, as I
mentioned before that Nasser’s control of Al-Azhar created a status of “vacuum in
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religious authority.” 308 Inexperienced and untrained popular leaders filled this vacuum. 309
Most of these incompetent religious leaders were conservative figures who opposed the
reform of personal status laws as they perceived them as a form of cultural imperialism,
and un-Islamic.
The reforms of 1985 and 2000, as we shall see, were a strong manifestation of the
increasing effect of the Islamization of the society on the adoption of personal status
reforms. Despite the fact that the state was willing to adopt more reforms, the opposition
from the Islamist groups was strong. In reforming personal status laws, President
Mubarak “was torn between his preference for a liberal legislation required by Egypt’s
commitment to modernity, and his awareness of the power of the religious conservatives
and fundamentalists.”310 As a result, the state emphatically asserted that the issued
reforms were in line with the shari‘ah.
According to Abu-Odeh, the issued reforms reflected the conflict between five
groups: The “islamicists” that included men and women as well. However, female
islamicists sought at reforming personal status laws to restrict prerogative male authority
while male islamicists aimed at preserving his power; Al-Azhar which sometimes
accepted the adoption of little reforms, while in other times opposed the enactment of
further reforms out of fear of losing its legitimacy within the society; a secular feminist
movement that struggled for the promotion of “formal equality “between men and
women; the liberal feminism that called for a new interpretation of religious texts that
would promote women’s rights; and the secular elite that controlled the state, and worried
about the increasing popularity of the islamicists within the society. 311 The elite engaged
“in push-and-pull support for further reforms depending on the public’s reaction, their
paramount concern being not the reform but the stability of their control over the
state.”312
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B. The Annulment of Law 44/1979
In 1980, a woman from Upper Egypt filed a law suit against her husband in El-Badary
Primary Court for Personal Status asking for financial maintenance. The Court argued
that law 44/ 1979 contravenes with articles (108) and (147) of the Constitution regarding
the right of the president of issuing laws because of exceptional conditions and in the
absence of the People’s Assembly. 313 Therefore, the Court refers the case to the Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC) for reviewing the constitutionality of law 44/1979.314 The
SCC refutes the argument made by the minister of People’s Assembly Affairs that laws
25/1920 and 25/1929 have been insufficient to deal with the ongoing social changes that
took place since the beginning of the twentieth century, and that law 44/1979 was a
313
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necessity and “a revolutionary decision to reform the family.” 315 The Court argues that
during the absence of the People’s Assembly, and according to article (147) of the
Constitution, “there was a lack of a particular incident that requires an exceptional
legislation from the President,” and ruled that law 44/1979 violates the Constitution. 316
The SCC’s decision reveals two crucial points: first, the ruling demonstrates that
the SCC started playing an influential role in determining what represents “necessary” or
“urgent” in reforming personal status laws. The Court did not consider the fundamental
social changes that took place after the adoption of the 1920 and 1929 laws as a necessary
condition that demands an exceptional law. Second, it challenges Bernard-Maugiron and
Dupret’s assertion that the SCC‘s abrogation of the law was adopted “in favor of
conservative Islamic milieus,” and that was considered a success for the Islamist trend
and a failure to the advocates of reforms. 317 Based on article (30) of Law 48/1979 that
manages the operation of the SCC, the case that is referred to the SCC has to “indicate
the legislative provision whose constitutionality is challenged, the constitutional
provision involved, and the different aspects of the alleged contravention.” 318 Initially,
El-Badary Primary Court referred the case on the ground that whether law 44/1979 is
consistent with articles (108) and (147) of the Constitution while it did not raise the issue
of whether law 44/1979 was compatible with article (2) of the Constitution. The Primary
Court’s action supports Lombardi’s argument that “deciding whether or not a law was
consistent with the principles at the Islamic [shari‘ah] was precisely the sort of
‘“political”’ issue which courts would generally try to avoid.” 319 As a result, the SCC did
not tackle in its decision the compatibility of law 44 with the shari‘ah. Interestingly,
when several cases were brought to the SCC challenging the compatibility of different
articles of law 44/1979 with article (2), the SCC considered these cases as a type of
political issue that it tried to avoid. This was evident in the SCC’s decision in case 36/2
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where Aswan Primary Court referred a case to the SCC asking its opinion regarding the
compatibility of article (6) of law 44/1979 with article (2) of the Constitution.320 The
SCC rejected the case arguing that it previously ruled out for the unconstitutionality of
law 44 as a whole, a stand the SCC maintained in all cases that challenged different
articles of law 44 with the shari‘ah.321

C. Law 100/1985
After the repeal of law 44/1979, women’s organizations pressured for the adoption of a
new law; as a result law 100/1985 was enacted.322 The new law introduces important
reforms such as: the husband has to certify the divorce; otherwise he would be subject to
imprisonment or paying fines, the right of the wife to ask for a divorce if her husband
gets another wife conditioned that she proves the occurrence of an injury that renders the
conjugal life “impossible between a couple of their status,”323 the wife’s disobedience of
her husband deprives her from her right to maintenance; however she has the right to
demonstrate before a primary court the legal grounds that justify her disobedience, the
husband has to compensate his wife if he divorces her without her consent by paying her
maintenance for two years, the husband has to provide his divorcee and their children a
suitable home during the custody period, and the mother custody for boy is until he
reaches ten and for girl until twelve, unless the judge decides that the interest of the child
requires the extension of the custody period to fifteen for the boy and until marriage for
the daughter .324 Interestingly, the new law is another version of law 44/1979 with only
320
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one difference: in case of a polygamous marriage, the first wife does not have the right to
get an automatic divorce; rather the court would decide whether to grant a divorce or
not.325
It is wrong to assume that law 100/1985champions women’s rights. True, the law
guarantees that the divorced wife has the right to remain in the conjugal house as long as
her children are in the age of custody. 326 However, if the period of custody elapses, the
divorced woman could no longer stay in the house.327 The feminist activist Farida alNaqqach, accurately describes the status of the divorced wife as “a nurse-maid, who
would lose all of her rights upon the termination of custody. And if she did not have any
children, she will have to depend on her parents, or her relatives, for residence; and of she
lacks employment or financial resources, she faces the street.”328 Despite women’s
organizations’ efforts to make the husband’s polygamous marriage a ground for getting
an automatic divorce, even without proving harm, the radical Islamists within the
People’s Assembly objected.329 The limited achievement of law 100/85 corroborates AlAtraqchi’s argument that although the main motive behind the state efforts for adopting
reforming regarding gender relations “was to deliver a social message compatible with its
own mantra of modernization; as political currency the ‘women’s issue’ was subject to
compromise in negotiation with conservative forces. This translated into a rather limited
reform of the Personal Status Law.”330

D. Law 1/2000
The beginning of the new millennium witnessed the issuance of law 1/2000 which
contains 79 articles that introduced new amendments such as the court’s acceptance of
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any written marriage document in order to enable a wife to get a divorce,331 the
notarization of the divorce certificate, and the establishment of a “family social
insurance” under the supervision of Nasser Social Bank, and whose role is to guarantee
the implementation of all court’s decisions regarding the provision of maintenance to“ the
wife, the divorcee, the children or the relatives.” 332 However, article (20) of Law 1/2000
remains the most important one as it provoked a fiery debate within the society. Based on
this article, a wife can get a khul, a divorce in court, in return, she has to relinquish all her
financial rights and give back the dower the husband paid to her. The divorce is
irrevocable, is “not subject to appeal,” and does not deprive the mother from keeping
children custody nor getting their maintenance fees. 333
The adoption of law 1/2000 was the product of a number of domestic and
international factors. Domestically, during the 1980’s, a group of women’s rights activists
published a booklet where they suggested a number of reforms that included the issuance
of a new marriage contract that enable a woman to insert conditions such as the right to
travel without getting the permission of her husband, and the right of a woman to get a
“judicial no-fault divorce” or khul.334 These suggested reforms were highly articulated by
the NGO Forum that was held at the time of the convening of the United Nations
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Egypt. Moreover, in 1993, the
National Commission for Women was reestablished and that marked the starting of
Suzanne Mubarak to pay attention to women’s problems. According to Hoda Elsadda, an
331
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Egyptian women’s rights activist, Suzanne Mubarak’s support of law 1 (2000) was the
main reason behind the passing of the law within the parliament “despite strong
opposition”, and as a result, the law was known as “Suzanne’s law”. 335 Internationally,
similar to Sadat, Mubarak perceived the reform of personal status law as an essential
“means of modernizing the country, enhancing the development process, and maintaining
the support of international organizations that generously fund the country’s various
development projects.”336 Moreover, in a bid to demonstrate Egypt’s commitment to
respect the rights of marginalized groups, particularly women and children, Mubarak
regime initiated several laws such as personal status law reforms in 2000, increasing the
number of women in parliamentary seats, and issued the document on children rights in
2008. However, Manar Shorbagy, an Egyptian Political Science professor, ascribed the
reason behind adding sixty-four seats for women in 2010 parliament to the fact that this
parliament will support Mubarak’s son candidacy for presidential elections in 2010. 337
Women, as an Egyptian activist woman argued, were used for “the beautification of the
ruling party’s despotic face.”338 This indicates that Mubarak regime used the issue of
women’s rights as a political toll to serve its own interest.
The opponents of the khul argued that only rich women will be able to benefit
from the khul law, while poor women would hesitate before accessing the court as they
could not afford to give up all her financial rights. 339 Some seconded this and added that
the khul is a class-based law as the main motivators were elite women, shaped by
international concepts such as “human rights, the UN Charter, and other international
conventions” which the majority of the people do not comprehend. 340 Others affirmed
that the law contradicts with Islam as it enables a wife to get a khul even if her husband
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dissents,341 and it is unconstitutional as it deprives the husband from the right to appeal
the court’s decision. 342 On the other hand, the supporters, mainly the state and women’s
rights activists, asserted the compatibility of the khul with the shari‘ah.343 The Rector of
Al-Azhar Sayyid Tantawi, known for his liberal interpretation of the religious texts,344
maintained that the law is consistent with the shari‘ah and that the majority of Al-Azhar
Islamic Research Academy’s members approved it.345 However, Fawzy questions
Tantawi’s claim and points out that during the session of voting on the khul draft law,
“fourteen of the members of the Academy were absent; fourteen members spoke and
eight others stayed silent throughout the session. Of the fourteen, who spoke, according
to the record of the meeting, five supported the law and eight objected.”346
Moreover, the Parliament, dominated by the ruling party, the National Democratic
Party (NDP), voted for the law. 347 According to Sonneveld, not all NDP’s members were
in favor of the law; rather numerous expressed their discontent and asserted that the law
contradicts with the shari‘ah, despite the assertion made by Al-Azhar Rector before the
People’s Assembly that the law did not violate the shari‘ah. As a result, the leaders of the
ruling party exerted intense pressure to force the dissenters to vote for the law. The
ferocious debate over the khul law does not only reflect a conflict between different
Islamic opinions; but also it mirrors the state’s struggle to maintain its power. Both
advocates and dissidents defended their position vis-a-vis the law through using Islam. 348
Both “claim that they have the right to interpret the principles of Islam in an authoritative
manner.”349 By placing Al-Azhar and the Parliament under its wing, “the government had
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monopolized the right to exercise ijtihad,”350 and determined what constitutes good for
the family in accordance to the shari‘ah.
Another important reform took place during Mubarak’s rule was law 10, adopted
in 2004, and it paved the way for the establishment of family courts whose main
responsibility is to deal with all cases related to conjugal conflicts, divorce and
custody.351 One of the important developments introduced by the family court system is
that in case of appeal, all cases will be referred to the Court of Appeal or “the highest
court of appeal for family cases” instead of the Court of Cassation. 352 The purpose behind
this development was to speed up the legal procedures and increase their efficiency so it
would be possible to deal with family law cases in a short period and effectively. 353
However, numerous lawyers and legal experts perceive this development as “a major
disadvantage…….mainly because it will deprive the new legal system of the wealth of
judgments that was provided by the Court of Cessation and through which legal
principles were later developed.”354 In addition, there is a lack of sufficiently well trained
lawyers to review the increasing number of cases. 355 Interestingly, these criticisms were
also raised at the beginning of the twentieth century with the introduction of personal
status law reforms, which raises doubt about describing these new laws as “reforms” as
they result in worsening rather than improving the status of women in Egypt.
More importantly, a number of women’s rights activists complained that the
government did not allow them to take part in the process of discussing and adopting the
law; rather legislators and different government bodies such as concerned ministries and
the National Council for Women (NCW) and the National Council for Childhood and
Motherhood (NCCM) controlled the process of issuing the law. 356 The real purpose
behind the state’s interest in founding NCW was to prevent the establishment of a
“Women’s Union NGO” which would include around two hundred NGOs, led by an
350
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opposition and women’s rights activist, Nawal Saadawi. 357 The state perceived that such
a union could threaten its interests,358 particularly controlling civil society and
undermining its authority in determining what constitutes good for the Egyptian family.
With the establishment of NCW, most fund provided by international organizations such
as the European Union and USAID and targeted women’s rights NGOs, have been
directed to NCW, which in turn employs this fund to attract prominent women’s rights
activists by paying them good salaries and putting them in important government
positions.359 The government used this strategy in order “to keep reforms of personal
status law under control.” 360

E. Does the SCC Promote Women’s Rights?
There is a widespread argument that judicial institutions could act as the protector and
enforcer of human rights; however the ability of these institutions to play these roles is
closely related to “political struggles and the distribution of power within any given
political system.”361 According to Moustafa, the SCC experienced a status of “insulated
liberalism”: although the SCC has struggled in maintaining its independence and
promoting human rights, it avoided issuing rulings that would undermine the state
predominant authority. For instance, the SCC ruled for the constitutionality of the
Emergency State Security Courts, while ignored “petitions on the constitutionality of
civilian transfers to military courts.”362 Moreover, according to articles (174) and (175) of
1971 Constitution, the SCC is an independent judiciary institution whose main job is
reviewing the constitutionality of laws. 363 However, the independence of the SCC, I
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would argue, is somehow questionable as based on article (5) of law 48/1979 that
regulates the operation of the SCC, the president appoints both the chief justice of the
SCC as well as some members of the Court justices. 364 This means that in most cases the
SCC justices are supporters of the regime. 365 Adding that in case of reaching a majority in
a decision, the Chief Justice will write the opinion if he is part of the majority, if not, he
chooses a justice to pen it down.366 Thus, the “power to write or assign opinions
combined with the absence of dissidents gives the Chief Justice extraordinary power to
shape the Court’s jurisprudence-particularly if the Chief Justice is in the majority.” 367
Against this background, the SCC’s different rulings that were in favor of
women’s rights do not necessarily reflect the Court’s commitment to liberal principles;
rather they might also mirror the fact that courts might be used as a tool to serve the
political interests of the state. Among the functions of the courts, in authoritarian
regimes, are “implementing unpopular polic[ies] and helping to bolster the regime’s
legitimacy.”368 This raises a lot of suspicion about President Mubarak’s strong assertion
in his speeches regarding the independence of the judicial system in Egypt. Zaki points
out that the area of personal status laws reflects the state’s control, though indirect, of the
judiciary process in Egypt. One of the main functions of the SCC is to review the
constitutionality of law, and Islamists often resorted to the SCC to challenge laws that
they considered in contradiction with the basic principles of the shari‘ah. The state, as a
result, used the Court as “a sort of stage for laws that are counterproductive to the
regime’s interests.”369 The state encouraged non-state actors to support cases that call for
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major reforms, and through this means, it attempted to “delegate politically controversial
reforms to other actors instead of bearing the consequences themselves.” 370 This was
often the tactic the state used to contain all opposition forces.
Nevertheless, the SCC has played an important role in defending human rights. It
developed a theory that is based on a “liberal interpretation of Islamic law.” 371 The SCC
distinguished between two elements: the principles of the shari‘ah that could “not be
subject to discretionary interpretation and existed in perpetuity”, and rules that are “open”
to various interpretations (using methods that are compatible with the shari‘ah’s
principles) in order to meet the ongoing changes within the society. 372 This theory served
the interests of the government in issuing laws that promoted women’s rights within the
family. 373 These laws “were inconsistent with classical Islam”, and provoked the anger of
the “conservative Islamists.”374 For instance, in 1985, a litigant challenges the
constitutionality of article (20) of law 100/1985 on the ground that it violates article (2)
of the Constitution and that personal status laws should be formed in accordance to the
Hanafi school. 375 The SCC argues that there is no clear-cut religious text that specifically
determines the end of the mother custody period, 376 and that the shari‘ah is flexible in
order to meet “the changing interests and needs of people.” 377 Therefore, the state “was
free to enact whatever rule would best serve the goals of the sha[ri‘ah].”378 Interestingly,
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the Court did not show how the law under examination could serve the goals of the
shari‘ah.379
In a different case, a husband filed a lawsuit where he challenged the
constitutionality of article (20) of law 1/2000 as it violates the shari‘ah which
“conditions the consensus of the husband for the khul,”380 and that the court’s decision is
not subject to appeal, a right that the 1971 constitution guarantees to all people alike. 381
The Court held that as for rules that are open to different interpretations, wali al amr (the
state) is the best person who is capable to provide the interpretation that serves the
interests of the society.382 In this sense, the SCC perceives the state as the most capable
political actor that could determine the “common good of the society” and therefore it has
the ultimate authority to impose its own interpretation of religious texts, even if this
interpretation is not supported by several Islamic scholars and groups.

F. Recapitulation
Both the state and the Islamic trend competed in “monopoliz[ing] religious rhetoric.”383
The SCC, through its various rulings, acted as an important means that supported state’s
legitimacy, 384 and its moderate interpretation of the religious texts. On the other hand, it
is not clear whether the SCC is a real supporter of women’s rights as it “has a mixed
record”: in different cases the Court struck down laws that promote women’s rights,385
while in other cases it defended them. A salient example is the SCC’s decision in 1985
regarding the unconstitutionality of the Presidential Decree law 44/1979. 386 However, in
the 1980’s, I would argue, Mubarak regime consistently announced its commitment to
379

LOMBARDI, supra note 375, at 210.
Case 201of the 23rd Judicial Year, decided on December 26th, 2002.
381
Id.
382
The Court adds that it is not necessary to abide by the opinions made by certain religious scholars as the
shari‘ah does not consider these opinions as “sacred,” and that scholars differed whether the consensus of
the husband is essential in issuing the khul. Moreover, the Court argues that “the khul case is different from
any other cases as the issuing ruling has to be final to end the dispute as a whole.”Id.
383
MOUSTAFA, supra note 33, at 37.
384
Id.at 39.
385
Moussa, supra note 5, at 193.
386
Id.
380

61

democracy and the rule of law. This encouraged the SCC to rule based on a full
conviction that the state respected its independence. However, the regime gradually got
less tolerant to opposition voices, and that was evident in the SCC’s stand for not taking
any confrontational stand with the regime, particularly with cases that would threaten the
legitimacy of the latter. The SCC’s rulings in favor of personal status laws reforms could
be interpreted as defending women’s rights as well as protecting the state’s political
interest.
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VI. Conclusion
This thesis examines the implication of the complicated relationship between law and
politics through dissecting the effect of changing political conditions on personal status
law reforms in Egypt. It shows that the political environment has had a great effect on the
interpretation of the shari‘ah. Egypt has been similar to other Muslim societies
where“[I]slamic rules have been selectively applied, emphasized, ignored, or
circumvented in accordance with the individual or group interests and current realities of
each area. Islam has been widely used as a rationale to justify and strengthen
patriarchy.”387 The introduction of new personal status reforms, as Bernard-Maugiron and
Dupret emphasize, “was always politicized.” 388 The rejection or the adoption of these
reforms was closely related to serve certain political interests as politics, at the end, “is
about interests and power; more often than not, about people abusing power to advance
their interests which in turn shores up their power.”389
Moreover, the thesis supports Song’s argument that “cultures are not entities that
exist prior to social and political interaction but rather are created in and through them.
This suggests the need to be attentive to how cultural traditions are created and sustained,
and by and for whom.”390 Islam represents an integral element of the Egyptian culture,
and based on Song’s thesis, it is important to understand the factors that shaped the
adoption of the different interpretations of the shari‘ah, and the reasons that pushed the
state to sometimes support a conservative interpretation, while in other time, it welcomed
a more liberal reading.
The issue of reforming personal status laws is more than just delineating men’s
and women’s rights in marriage and divorce. Rather, it is, as Shaham asserts, among the
different “means of reshaping society.”391 However, these reforms did not necessarily
result in the improvement of the status of women. These vaunted reforms were based on
387

Tohidi, supra note 307, at 278.
Bernard-Maugiron & Dupret, supra note 162, at 16.
389
SONG, supra note 17, at 74.
390
Id., at 39.
391
SHAHAM, supra note 37, at 228.
388

63

what Sonbol describes as the “new Sharī‘a” as it was applied in a way that was
completely different from the way that it was used to be during the Ottoman days. 392
The “new Sharī‘a” included laws that the state committee formed through relying on
“basic Islamic juridical texts. What was happening therefore is that while the public in
general supported a legal and moral eternal ‘Sharī‘a espoused by a patriarchal state and
the clerical hierarchy, in actual fact a new state-patriarchy was being created.”393 Thus,
the thesis challenges the description of the changes that were introduced to personal
status laws, were in fact ‘reforms’.
The thesis argues that the deterioration of women’s legal status within the family
is the result of the following factors:
1. The Weakness of the Official Religious Institution
The state’s control of Al–Azhar resulted in the weakness of religious institution in
Egypt and paved the way for the emergence of radical Islamic movements.394 As Abou El
Fadl succinctly argues that “[m]arginalized and displaced, Islamic law was now a field
ripe for pietistic fictions and crass generalizations, rather than a technical discipline of
complex interpretive practices and sophisticated methodologies of social and textual
analysis.”395 This deterioration in religious authority has had a negative impact on the
status of women in Egypt on the long run as any calls for the reform of personal status
laws has always been received by rejection by these popular leaders who perceive these
reforms as un-Islamic and an attempt to westernize the Islamic society.
2. A Biased Interpretation of the Constitution and the Personal Status Laws
Despite the fact that since Sadat era, Egypt has witnessed a status of political as
well as economic liberalization, women’s rights have not improved as a consequence.
The inclusion of women’s rights in the political sphere and civil society, where the call
for liberty and equality is highly articulated, “coexists with the social acceptance of
392
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continuing gender inequality in the family. In this way, liberal societies offer modern
forms of patriarchal relations and control.”396 Equality between citizens as stipulated by
the Egyptian constitutions in the post colonial period does not necessarily mean that both
men and women are equal in the public and private spheres. This indicates that
“citizenship is not a gender-neutral category,”397 rather “citizenship rights for Egyptian
women have reflected the economic and ideological interests of the regime in power.” 398
The state’s “interpretation of equality as sameness required women to fit within a
political arena that was dominated and defined by men.”399 A “socio-legal culture” that
supports gender equality does not exist. Shaham ascribes the slow in the reform of
personal status laws to the fact that family values are closely related to culture and
traditions, and “that the major determinant of women’s status is ‘social mythology’,
which is the most difficult to challenge and consequently to change.” 400
Viewed from a different perspective, the interpretation of several articles of
personal status laws was left to the judge’s perception. This was evident in the
interpretation of what constitutes “harm.” Liberal judge (prone to expand women’s
rights) offers an interpretation that is different from that of the conservative judge
(inclined to restrict women’s rights). 401 For instance, Judge Mohammed Khafaji, the
Vice-President of the Cassation Court in the 1980’s argued that polygamous marriage did
not present a form of harm and that only beating severely and any form of husband’s
mistreatment of his wife are considered as types of harm. 402 In a different case (case
858/1998), the Court of Cassation identified that harm “is established through the
testimony of two men or one man and two women” in accordance to the dominant
opinion of the Hanafi school. 403 However, in case of domestic violence, how could a
battered wife bring these witnesses?
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3. Absence of a Tolerant Culture
According to Chatterjee, although nationalism could contribute in the emergence
of fundamentalist movements or suppressive regime, it still embodies a necessity for
advancement and freedom. He stresses the importance of perceiving nationalism
as part of a social, intellectual and moral revolution of which the aspirations to
democracy and personal freedom are also products. It is connected with these
aspirations, and even serves to strengthen them and to create some of the social
conditions of their realization, even though it so often also perverts them. 404
However, Chatterjee alerts that several forms of “deviations” might take place, and this
deviation has to be analyzed from a sociological perspective. 405 Nationalism in Egypt is a
relevant case. It resulted in the consolidation of oppressive regimes that did all their best
to undermine other competing authorities. This created an atmosphere of intolerance that
was first imposed by the state, then unconsciously absorbed and accepted by the people.
The different Islamic movements that emerged within Egypt assumed that they
represented the true Islam, and unfortunately a lot of people accepted this assumption and
they in turn become intolerant to anyone oppose them. A patriarchal and intolerant
society could not promote women’s rights.
4. A Low Rate of Women’s Political Participation
Deteriorating economic conditions, a high rate of illiteracy, deeply-entrenched
patriarchal norms, and women’s ignorance of their political rights; all present major
factors that explain the reluctance of the majority of the Egyptian women to participate in
the political life. 406 Mubarak’s regime tended to always portray itself as a democratic
state that respected human rights. However, the problem lies in the state’s perception of
what constitutes ‘democracy’. In most cases, the state perceived that free elections,
though fraudulent, are the main indicators of democracy. This indicates that the Egyptian
state adopted a formal version of democracy, while ignored the liberal democracy that
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allows deliberation. However, deliberation is not only realized “in a range of official
political fora, such as legislatures, courtrooms, and electoral campaigns, but also in a
range of informal settings in civil society, including political demonstrations, the media,
local communities, and cultural associations.” 407 Egyptian women are deprived from an
efficient participation in most of these deliberative forms, and the low rate of women’s
participation in the parliament represents another great impediment for the advancement
of women’s rights and the reforms of personal status laws. In this case, women seek the
“protection by and from men.” 408
Major personal status laws reforms will not be realized without an effective
participation of the Egyptian women in the political life and in deliberation. In the post of
25 January and 30 June Revolutions, all expectations are pinned on a new democratic
Egypt where all marginalized as well as minority groups will fully participate in the
political life. The participation of these groups is essential “for clarifying what is at stake
in cultural conflicts and for devising contextually wise solutions.”409 Moreover, if
women’s organizations seek to change personal status laws it is important, as Sonbol
argues, to stress that the shari‘ah is not “the stagnant, unchanging, and unchangeable
collection of laws that its critics and conservative advocates make it out to be, but rather
as a venue for deliberation and designing laws that are preferable for society.” 410
5. A City-based Interpretation of What Constitutes “Islamic”
As I mentioned earlier, the personal status laws were mainly formulated by an
elite group who lived in the city and were shaped by the European culture. Thus, the city
has dominated the interpretation of the shari‘ah while those in the countryside lacked a
voice in this interpretation. Women in different rural areas were deprived of having their
rights in inheritance and bequeath as it was stated in the Qur’an. 411 This signifies the
407
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inability of the rural women to voice their demands or to even pressure the state for
getting their rights.
The improvement of women’s status in Egypt will rely, on a liberal interpretation
of the shari‘ah, which Al-Nowaihi describes as “broad enough to accord the Egyptian
woman the rights of which she is still robbed, to allow her all her legitimate rights, to do
it in the fullest accord with the divine teaching, but not in slavish confinement within the
limitations of ancient Jurisprudence, and also to do it in step with the needs of the modern
age.”412 Some feminists pin hopes on the 2014 Constitution for the promotion of
women’s rights in Egypt in the post 30 June Revolution. Article (11) of the new
Constitution stipulates that men and women are equal in all rights “in accordance to the
provisions of the Constitution.”413 However, this thesis shows that the advancement of
women’s rights is a complicated matter, and having a Constitution that guarantees
equality between citizens is not sufficient to promote women’s rights. The lack of a
democratic culture that would allow different groups to pressure for their rights is one of
the utmost factors that prevents the reform of personal status. As Selma Botman asserts,
“gender equality should be connected with the democratization of the family, the
workplace, the community, and the state.”414
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